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Abstract
The paper presents an empirical analysis of the innovative activities of business groups in Latin 
America. It compares the innovativeness of group-affiliated firms (GAFs) and standalone firms 
(SAFs), and it investigates how country-specific institutional factors – financial, legal, and labor 
market institutions – affect the group-innovation relationship. The empirical analysis is based on 
the most recent wave of the World Bank Enterprise Survey (period 2010-2011), and it focuses 
on a sample of 6500 manufacturing firms across 20 Latin American countries. The econometric 
results point out two major conclusions. First, GAFs are more innovative than SAFs: we estimate 
the innovation propensity of GAFs to be 9% higher than that of SAFs. Secondly, across countries, 
the innovativeness of GAFs is higher for national economies with a better institutional system 
than for countries with a less efficient institutional set up. 
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1. Introduction 
Business groups permeate emerging economies, often accounting for a 
substantial share of value added and employment. A business group 
can be defined as “a set of firms which though legally independent, 
are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and 
are accustomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001: 47).  
 
The existence, ubiquity and remarkable dynamics of business groups 
in emerging markets has stimulated a large amount of research, which 
has investigated a number of related topics such as the reasons for the 
emergence of groups, their ownership structure, their differentiation 
and vertical integration patterns, and their economic performance 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Colpan et al., 2010). The existing literature 
does on the whole provide a rich and thorough characterization of 
business groups and their importance for economic development. 
There are however two important issues and open questions that de-
serve further scholarly attention, and which provide the motivations 
for undertaking the present study. 
 
The first is that, while there exist several studies focusing on the fi-
nancial and economic performance of groups, much less is known 
about their strategies, i.e. how groups organize their business activities 
and what makes them more (or less) successful than independent en-
terprises. One important organizational strategy that deserves closer 
attention is innovation. The question of how business groups organize 
their innovative activities represents an important though unexplored 
area of research. A few recent studies have raised this question, and 
provided empirical evidence suggesting that GAFs are on average 
more innovative than SAFs. This is due, among other factors, to busi-
ness groups’ greater access to financial and human capital resources, 
as well as their ability to take advantage of within-group and foreign 
spillovers (Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Mahmood and Lee, 2004; 
Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010). 
 
The second question that deserves further research refers to the effects 
of country-specific institutional characteristics on the performance and 
strategies of business groups. An important argument discussed in the 
literature is the so-called institutional voids thesis. According to this, 
business groups originate and prosper when national institutions are 
weak and, correspondingly, groups performance is relatively better in 
countries characterized by weaker institutions than in economies with 
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well-functioning institutional set ups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Car-
ney et al., 2011). 
 
This argument has recently been extended by Chang et al. (2006) to 
the study of business groups’ innovativeness. In line with the standard 
interpretation of the institutional voids thesis, Chang et al. (2006)’s 
argument is that the positive effects of group affiliation on innovation 
are stronger in less developed (emerging) economies, in which groups 
make up for market failures and institutional weaknesses, particularly 
with respect to financial infrastructure, legal institutions and labor 
markets regulations. 
 
These two open questions motivate and structure the present paper. 
Our first objective is to provide new evidence on business groups’ in-
novative activities in Latin America, and investigate whether group-
affiliated firms (GAFs) are more innovative than standalone firms 
(SAFs). Our second objective is to reassess the institutional voids the-
sis and its relevance to study the innovative activities of firms in Latin 
America, and analyze in particular how country-specific institutional 
characteristics affect the relationship between group affiliation and 
innovation. 
 
The empirical analysis makes use of the most recent wave of the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) database, referring to the pe-
riod 2010-2011. The WBES is a rich and extensive survey dataset of 
several thousand business firms in developing countries, providing 
information on their characteristics, strategies, economic performance, 
as well as their perceptions of the institutional, policy and economic 
environment in which they operate. A key characteristic of the WBES 
dataset is that it contains information on firms’ ownership, so that we 
are able to identify which firms in the database are part of a domestic 
group, and distinguish these from the group of standalone firms.  
 
Our study focuses on a sample of around 6500 manufacturing enter-
prises in 20 different countries in Latin America. The topic of business 
groups’ innovation activities and their relationships to national institu-
tional conditions is highly relevant for emerging economies in Latin 
America (Schneider, 2009). During the last two decades, many Latin 
American economies have undertaken extensive institutional changes 
and economic reforms – such as privatizations, trade liberalization, 
financial and macroeconomic stabilization – intended to make domes-
tic markets more open, competitive and efficient. The new competi-
tive environment opens up new challenges and opportunities for do-
mestic firms in the region, and it is thus important to study how busi-
ness groups are responding to the changing economic environment, 
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and the extent to which their strategies and performance differ from 
those of standalone enterprises. 
 
On the whole, the paper contributes to the literature along three main 
dimensions. First, we provide new evidence and quantitative analysis 
of business groups strategies and innovation activities. In line with the 
few recent studies on this topic, we find that GAFs are more innova-
tive than SAFs, and we estimate the innovation propensity of GAFs to 
be 9% higher than that of SAFs.  
 
Secondly, we carry out a cross-country test of the institutional voids 
thesis and its relation to firms’ innovation activities. Our results differ 
from those of Chang et al. (2006). We show that, across countries in 
Latin America, the innovativeness of GAFs is higher for national 
economies with a better institutional system than for countries with a 
less efficient institutional set up. Financial, legal and labor market in-
stitutions provide an important infrastructure sustaining business 
firms’ innovation activities, and this enhancing effect is stronger for 
group-affiliated firms in well-functioning and better-organized nation-
al systems of innovation.  
 
Finally, by making use of the extensive set of firm-level information 
available in the WBES database, our paper suggests a new avenue for 
empirical analyses in the field. We show that this dataset can be used 
to compare business groups’ characteristics, strategies and perfor-
mance for several thousand firms across the whole developing world. 
The results presented in this paper, therefore, can be replicated and 
extended in future research on business groups in emerging econo-
mies. 

2. Business groups in Latin America 
Business groups have for a long time been dominant players in Latin 
American economies. They are typically large, family-owned, hierar-
chically controlled and diversified. They account for a large share of 
value added and employment in many countries in the region. Schnei-
der (2009) points out business groups as a key dimension of the Latin 
American variety of capitalism, which he defines as hierarchical mar-
ket economies. Hierarchical market economies in Latin America, a 
hybrid type between the two standard categories of liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 
2001), are in particular sustained by four main pillars (Schneider, 
2009): (1) the relevance of diversified business groups, (2) a high-
presence of multinational corporations, (3) low-skilled labor, (4) at-
omistic labor relations coupled with extensive (and often inefficient) 
labor market regulations (Botero et al., 2004). These four characteris-
tics are closely intertwined and tend to reinforce each other: it is these 
institutional complementarities that explain why business groups con-
stitute a structural and long-standing feature of this region. 
 
Despite their importance, empirical data and evidence on business 
groups in Latin America is scant and far more limited than it is the 
case for other emerging economies (e.g. in East Asia). Chile is the 
economy in the region with a relatively better availability of infor-
mation on business groups’ strategies and performance. Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) used this information to study the relationship between 
diversification and the financial performance of groups in Chile in the 
period 1988-1996. Khanna and Rivkin (2006) analyzed the relation-
ships between interorganizational ties, family ownership and business 
groups. Another important work on Chile was presented by Khanna 
and Palepu (1999), which investigated the evolution of 18 large and 
diversified groups in the period 1987-1997, and showed that deregula-
tion and other economic reforms in this decade did not have a negative 
effect on the performance of domestic business groups, as one would 
expect, but they rather contributed to strengthen their market domi-
nance. 
 
More recently, a set of descriptive studies have provided new infor-
mation and an updated overview of business groups in other Latin 
American countries: Argentina (Fracchia et al., 2010), Brazil (Al-
drighi and Postali, 2010), Mexico (Hoshino, 2010) and Central Amer-
ican countries (Bull and Kasahara, 2012). Although some country 
specificities exist, these studies identify some important commonali-
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ties. In most cases, groups originated several decades ago, and their 
initial formation and growth was closely linked and actively supported 
by public policies, such as State-led industrialization strategies, public 
ownership, trade protection and public procurement. Business groups 
have traditionally had close ties to national governments and often a 
strong political influence on them. The extensive process of economic 
reforms that was undertaken in many countries in the region during 
the 1980s and 1990s – privatizations, trade liberalization, financial 
and macroeconomic stabilization – does not seem to have affected 
groups more than other firms. Business groups did in fact grow 
stronger and found new strategies to survive in the new highly com-
petitive environment. As a result, business groups do still play today a 
major role in all of these economies. 
 
Despite these recent contributions, empirical evidence on business 
groups in Latin America is still limited and far less extensive than it is 
the case for East Asian countries. On the one hand, most of the exist-
ing recent studies are descriptive in nature and do not provide insights 
on how the performance of business groups is affected by group-
specific characteristics and strategies, such as ownership, diversifica-
tion, internationalization and technological innovation. The latter is an 
increasingly important factor for catching up countries in the region 
(Castellacci and Archibugi, 2008; Castellacci, 2011), and it is there-
fore important to investigate business groups’ capabilities and techno-
logical performance. 
 
On the other hand, a second important research gap in this literature is 
that most of the existing studies focus on individual countries, and 
there exist very few cross-country studies comparing groups’ charac-
teristics and dynamics across countries in Latin America. This limits 
our ability to understand the relationships between country-specific 
characteristics, institutional features and firm-level performance. Spe-
cifically, cross-country analyses are important as they may provide 
insights on the empirical validity of the so-called institutional voids 
thesis: that business groups originate and prosper when national insti-
tutions are weak and that, correspondingly, groups performance is rel-
atively better in countries characterized by weaker institutions than in 
economies with well-functioning institutional set ups (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007; Carney et al., 2011). 
 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) present a cross-country analysis of 14 
emerging markets, which does not find any significant evidence that 
group-affiliated firms have a better financial performance than 
standalone enterprises for the four Latin American economies in the 
sample (Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Argentina). Khanna and Yafeh 
(2005) carry out a cross-country test of the institutional voids thesis, 
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reporting no significant correlation between countries’ quality of legal 
and financial institutions and business groups’ extent and perfor-
mance. These studies, taken together with the literature presented in 
this section, are suggestive. In Latin America, groups emerged and 
originally prospered through active public support and protection. 
Even after the wave of economic reforms in the 1990s and the related 
institutional upgrading, groups did not disappear or worsened their 
performance, but found new strategies and ways to compete, often 
maintaining their close ties to national authorities. This calls for an 
investigation of the institutional voids thesis for the case of Latin 
America, and an analysis of its relation to business groups’ innovation 
strategies and performance. 
 

3. Theory and hypotheses 
The first question we investigate is whether group-affiliated firms 
(GAFs) are more innovative than standalone firms (SAFs). A few 
studies have recently extended the business groups literature to ana-
lyze this unexplored topic (Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Mahmood 
and Lee, 2004; Chang et al., 2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010). 
The empirical results of these works all point to a positive impact of 
group affiliation on innovation, due to the following channels. 
 
First, GAFs can more easily get access to financial capital within the 
group when external financial markets are inefficient, and hence also 
reduce the uncertainties related to R&D investments. Secondly, when 
the country has a low level of human capital and workers’ skills, 
GAFs may provide workers with training and more efficiently allocate 
labor resources internally within the group. Thirdly, when the home 
market is not well developed, GAFs may overcome the lack of inde-
pendent suppliers and advanced users by linking to other firms of the 
same (vertically-integrated) group. Hence, vertical integration may 
partly substitute for the lack of a good home market. Relatedly, GAFs 
may have greater access to internal information and advanced 
knowledge (within-group spillovers). Fourthly, due to their estab-
lished market position and distribution network, GAFs are in a better 
position to develop collaborations with foreign firms and MNEs, so 
possibly exploiting knowledge imitation and foreign spillovers.  
 
We argue that these general arguments are highly plausible for the 
Latin American context, and it is therefore reasonable to point out this 
first hypothesis for our study: 
 
H1: GAFs are more innovative than SAFs. 
 
The second question we investigate is whether country-specific insti-
tutional factors affect firm-level innovation, and whether these effects 
are stronger for GAFs than for SAFs. As noted in the previous section, 
we intend to provide a cross-country test of the institutional voids the-
sis and assess its empirical validity within the Latin American context. 
In its general formulation, this thesis argues that business groups orig-
inate and prosper when national institutions are weak and that, corre-
spondingly, groups performance is relatively better in countries char-
acterized by weaker institutions than in economies with well-
functioning institutional set ups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Carney et 
al., 2011). This argument has recently been extended by Chang et al. 
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(2006) to the study of business groups’ innovativeness. Chang et al. 
(2006)’s argument is that the positive effects of group affiliation on 
innovation are more relevant in less developed (emerging) economies, 
in which groups make up for market failures and institutional weak-
nesses, particularly with respect to financial infrastructure, legal insti-
tutions and labor markets regulations. 
 
We take a different point of view on this question. Our paper argues 
that it is not straightforward to extend the institutional voids thesis to 
the study of business groups’ innovation activities, and that the con-
clusions may well be that groups’ innovativeness is stronger in coun-
tries characterized by better and more efficient institutions, rather than 
in economies with weaker institutional set ups. We develop and ex-
plain this argument in three steps. 
 
First, an important and commonly shared starting point in the innova-
tion literature is that firms’ innovation investments are enabled and 
supported by country-level institutions (so-called national systems of 
innovation; Nelson, 1993; Castellacci and Natera, 2012). In particular, 
financial institutions favor private firms’ access to finance, making 
available resources to invest in R&D; legal institutions and an effi-
cient court system favor commercial transactions, contract enforcing 
and the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs); and labor 
market regulations affect the pool of human resources that a firm can 
draw from, or determine the flexibility of the labor market and the 
ability of firms to hire new workers. These arguments are not only in 
line with the national systems of innovation literature, but are also re-
lated to the varieties of capitalism framework, which emphasizes the 
importance of public institutions as a supportive framework for pri-
vate firms’ performance and innovativeness, and the complementari-
ties among different institutional conditions that tend to reinforce each 
other and make, among other things, groups as a permanent feature of 
emerging economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schneider, 2009). We 
summarize this by pointing out the following general hypothesis: 
 
H2: Financial, legal and labor market institutions are important fac-
tors for firms’ innovation.  
 
Secondly, we ask whether country-level institutions are more relevant 
for the innovativeness of GAFs than for SAFs. Our standpoint is that – 
within each country – financial, legal and labor market institutions are 
more supportive of innovative activities for GAFs than SAFs. The 
reason is that GAFs are in general better established in the market, and 
have a greater propensity and capability to undertake innovation activ-
ities (as pointed out by H1). Hence, the lack of well-functioning insti-
tutions supporting innovations will affect GAFs relatively more than 
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SAFs. In other words, GAFs are more exposed to the lack of innova-
tion infrastructures than SAFs since they have higher innovation pro-
pensity. For instance, if legal institutions in a country are weak, the 
lack of IPRs protection and efficient contract enforcing mechanisms 
will penalize GAFs more strongly than SAFs since the former have 
R&D investments more frequently than the latter. 
 
H3: Within each country, financial, legal and labor market institu-
tions are more important factors for the innovativeness of GAFs than 
SAFs. 
 
Thirdly, what are the cross-country implications of this argument? 
Since GAFs are more engaged in innovation than SAFs (H1), and giv-
en that institutional weaknesses will affect the former more than the 
latter (H3), the implication of our argument is that, across countries, 
the better the institutional system, the stronger will be the innovation 
performance of GAFs as compared to that of SAFs. Our hypothesis is 
then different from the point made by Chang et al. (2006). While we 
agree that GAFs may have strong internal capabilities and resources 
and hence partly make up for weak or inefficient institutions, we also 
argue that firm-level innovative activities are greatly supported by 
country-level infrastructures and national systems of innovation: the 
stronger and more efficient these country-specific support mecha-
nisms, the higher the innovativeness of business groups.   
 
H4: Across countries, the difference between the innovativeness of 
GAFs and SAFs is stronger in countries with better financial, legal 
and labor market institutions. 
 

4. Data and indicators 
Our empirical analysis makes use of the World Bank Enterprise Sur-
veys (WBES) database. This is a rich and extensive survey dataset of 
several thousand business firms in nearly all developing countries, 
providing information on their characteristics, strategies, economic 
performance, as well as their perceptions of the institutional, policy 
and economic environment in which they operate. The WBES follows 
a stratified random sampling with replacement, based on firm size, 
business sector and geographic region as the main strata, which en-
sures representativeness of the results within each country. The survey 
questionnaire follows a standard template, in order to ensure cross-
country comparability of the results.1 
 
We focus on the most recent wave of the WBES, the one referring to 
the period 2010-2011. A key characteristic of the WBES dataset does 
now contain information on firms’ ownership. From this information, 
we are able to identify which firms in the database are part of a do-
mestic group (GAFs), and distinguish these from the group of 
standalone firms (SAFs). This information is very valuable from the 
point of view of the business groups literature. So far, group identifi-
cation has in fact been a controversial and difficult task for empirical 
works in this field (Khanna, 2000; Yafeh, 2005), and the information 
on group affiliation has often been limited to enterprises within a spe-
cific country. The present paper, by making use of the new infor-
mation available in the WBES 2010, suggests a new avenue for empir-
ical analyses in the field, making it possible to compare business 
group characteristics, strategies and performance for several thousand 
firms across the whole developing world. 
 
Our study focuses on 20 Latin American countries, covering nearly 
the whole region.2 The whole sample contains a total number of 
around 13 000 firms, covering all sectors of economic activity (agri-
culture, manufacturing and services). However, since one of the varia-
bles of our interest, technological innovation, is only available for 
firms in the manufacturing sector, we eventually narrowed down our 
sample to a total number of around 6500 enterprises. 
 
                                                 
1  For a detailed description of the dataset and its methodology, see the WBES page: 
www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
2  The list of countries in the sample is available in table 2. We were forced to disregard 
Brazil from our analysis, since the Brazilian questionnaire does not contain any infor-
mation on firms’ innovation activities.  
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The empirical analysis makes use of the following 12 indicators. Ta-
ble 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the whole sample, table 2 
reports the mean of the variables for each country, and table 3 shows 
the coefficients of correlation among these indicators. 
 
GAF: Group-affiliated firm. Dummy variable indicating whether an 
enterprise is part of a domestic group. This indicator has been ob-
tained by interacting (multiplying) two dummy variables of the WBES 
questionnaire: (1) the one reporting whether “the establishment is part 
of a larger firm” (question A.7); (2) the one indicating whether “the 
firm is owned by private domestic individuals, companies or organiza-
tions”.3 This variable is then able to distinguish two types of enterpris-
es in our sample: domestic group-affiliated firms (GAFs) and domes-
tic standalone firms (SAFs). Table 1 shows that 12,4% in our sample 
are GAFs, and table 2 indicates that there is substantial variability in 
the presence of GAFs across countries in the region, ranging from on-
ly 1% in Colombia to more than 20% in Argentina and Bolivia. 
 
INNO: Innovation. Dummy variable indicating whether an enterprise 
has carried out R&D investments in the period (question LAC.E6). 
This is a standard indicator of technological innovation, which is the 
predominant type of innovation for firms in manufacturing industries. 
R&D investments are not only important because they lead to the in-
troduction of brand new products and processes, but also because they 
increase a firm’s capability to imitate external advanced knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The indicator is therefore useful to 
measure Latin American firms’ innovation propensity as well as their 
imitation ability. On average, 45% of manufacturing firms in the sam-
ple have undertaken R&D investments in the period.4 
 
SIZE: Size of the firm. Categorical indicator taking three possible 
values: 1 if the firm has between 5 and 20 employees; 2 if it has be-
tween 20 and 100 workers; 3 if it has more than 100 employees (ques-
tion A.6 of the WBES survey). The average firm size category in our 
sample is 2 (between 20 and 100 workers), and the cross-country vari-
ability of this indicator is low: in all of the Latin American countries 
in the sample, small and medium-sized enterprises constitute the bulk 
of the business population. 
 
                                                 
3  This second variable has been obtained from question B.2a, assuming that a firm is do-
mestically owned if at least 50% of its ownership belongs to private domestic individuals, 
companies or organizations. 
4  In addition to this R&D variable, we have also used a dummy variable indicating whether 
the firm has introduced a new product in the period (NEW_PROD). The new product 
dummy measures the outcome of innovation. It is interesting to use this variable, along 
with the R&D dummy, in order to see whether the main patterns investigated in the paper 
also hold for the innovation performance of firms in addition to their innovation propensi-
ty. 
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AGE: Age of the enterprise. Number of years since the establish-
ment began operations (question B.5). The variable ranges from 0 to 
340 years, and the mean value is approximately 28 years. Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay are the countries with the oldest average firm 
(around 34 years). 
 
QUALITY: Quality certification. Dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm has “an internationally-recognized quality certifica-
tion, such as ISO 9000, 9002 or 14000” (question B.8). On average 
28% of enterprises in the sample report to have obtained quality certi-
fication (highest percentage is 38% in Argentina and Chile). 
 
EDUC: Education level. “Average number of years of education of a 
typical permanent full-time production worker employed in the estab-
lishment” (question L.9a). The mean value in the region is 10 years. 
Central American countries do mostly score below the average on this 
indicator.  
 
ICT: ICT infrastructure. Dummy variable reporting whether a firm 
has “a high-speed Internet connection on its premises” (question 
C.23). A large majority of firms in the sample (87%) report to have 
good Internet infrastructure, although the variable differs substantially 
across countries – ranging from 95% in Argentina, Colombia and Ec-
uador to below 65% in most Central American countries. 
 
DIVERSIF: Product diversification. Percentage of total sales repre-
sented by other products than the firm’s main product (question 
D.1a3). The mean value of this variable in the sample is 30%, alt-
hough less developed economies in Central America have on average 
a lower degree of product diversification than more advanced coun-
tries in South America. 
 
URBAN: Urban density. Indicator reporting the size of the city in 
which the firm is located. The variable is categorical and takes five 
possible values: 1 if it is a town with less than 50000 inhabitants; 2 
between 50000 and 250000 people; 3 between 250000 and 1 million; 
4 if it is a city with population over 1 million, but not a capital city; 5 
if it is a capital city. The indicator is obtained from question A.3, and 
it is used as a proxy for urban density and agglomeration economies. 
 
FINANCE: Financial system. Variable indicating whether “access to 
finance – which includes availability and cost, interest rates, fees and 
collateral requirements – is an obstacle to the current operations of the 
firm” (question K.30). The variable is categorical, ranging from a val-
ue of 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
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LEGAL: Legal system. Variable indicating whether legal courts rep-
resent an obstacle to the current operations of the enterprise (question 
J.30). The variable is categorical, ranging from a value of 0 (no obsta-
cle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
 
LABOR: Labor regulations. Variable indicating whether “labor reg-
ulations are an obstacle to the current operations of the firm” (question 
L.30). The variable is categorical, ranging from a value of 0 (no ob-
stacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
 
These three last variables, FINANCE, LEGAL and LABOR, represent 
our indicators of country-specific institutional conditions. They are 
measured at the firm-level, indicating private firms’ perceptions of the 
institutional environment in which they operate. The country average 
of these variables provides a measure of the institutional and regulato-
ry set up that characterizes each national economy.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Whole sample  
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
GAF 0.124 0.329 0 1 6573 
INNO 0.451 0.497 0 1 6573 
SIZE 2.004 0.809 1 3 6573 
AGE 27.84 21.34 0 340 6535 
QUALITY 0.280 0.449 0 1 6263 
EDUC 10.33 3.95 0 100 6059 
ICT 0.868 0.338 0 1 6401 
DIVERSIF 30.36 26.14 1 100 6504 
URBAN 1.992 1.26 1 5 6573 
FINANCE 1.622 1.25 0 4 6504 
LEGAL 1.625 1.37 0 4 6369 
LABOR 
 
1.723 
 
1.21 
 
0 
 
4 
 
6549 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Mean values by country  
 
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia 
Costa Ri-
ca 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salva-
dor 
Guatemala Guyana 
GAF 0.212 0.266 0.183 0.011 0.079 0.065 0.075 0.192 0.065 0.222 
INNO 0.593 0.667 0.424 0.573 0.442 0.328 0.483 0.416 0.388 0.486 
SIZE 1.958 2.109 1.992 2.034 1.846 2.155 2.025 2.001 1.884 1.986 
AGE 34.59 29.92 32.77 25.08 26.24 21.95 31.59 26.53 26.00 27.93 
QUALITY 0.383 0.315 0.379 0.337 0.199 0.241 0.339 0.252 0.133 0.303 
EDUC 10.60 11.828 11.46 10.61 8.739 9.541 11.38 10.00 8.204 - 
ICT 0.948 0.857 0.882 0.953 0.860 0.917 0.958 0.840 0.745 - 
DIVERSIF 37.24 31.54 30.55 32.64 31.75 35.73 29.99 29.42 28.47 22.97 
URBAN 2.930 2.458 1.539 1.401 3.303 1.664 1.942 3.072 1.434 4.125 
FINANCE 2.037 1.607 1.410 1.937 2.182 1.553 1.479 2.048 1.572 1.267 
LEGAL 2.083 1.723 1.092 1.383 1.297 1.633 2.060 1.823 2.047 1.289 
LABOR 2.512 2.092 1.746 1.745 1.556 1.652 1.608 1.080 1.413 0.833 
Observations 
 
791 
 
120 
 
775 
 
705 
 
326 
 
122 
 
120 
 
125 
 
355 
 
72 
 
 
 
 Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua 
 
Panama 
 
Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela 
GAF 0.100 0.074 0.146 0.079 0.087 0.118 0.133 0.026 0.044 0.153 
INNO 0.326 0.272 0.369 0.262 0.087 0.559 0.559 0.040 0.397 0.317 
SIZE 1.826 1.901 2.263 1.865 1.826 2.051 1.960 1.547 1.828 1.882 
AGE 24.81 34.07 24.85 27.78 24.48 27.47 22.62 21.15 34.46 26.13 
QUALITY 0.234 0.217 0.243 0.242 0.225 0.282 0.273 0.133 0.191 0.212 
EDUC 8.393 11.29 9.757 8.286 11.66 10.39 11.73 - 8.964 10.59 
ICT 0.637 0.647 0.885 0.516 0.583 0.898 0.906 - 0.814 0.929 
DIVERSIF 24.99 18.47 28.33 22.55 18.04 30.15 32.65 16.34 30.08 24.10 
URBAN 2.193 1.719 1.897 2.222 1.774 2.381 1.405 5.000 1.433 1.753 
FINANCE 1.671 1.775 1.568 1.306 0.817 1.144 1.323 2.093 1.327 1.287 
LEGAL 2.083 1.205 1.775 1.836 1.330 1.885 1.880 2.066 0.741 1.445 
LABOR 1.440 0.871 1.598 1.219 0.843 1.703 1.671 1.920 1.941 2.035 
Observations 
 
150 
 
121 
 
1152 
 
126 
 
115 
 
118 
 
760 
 
75 
 
360 
 
85 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
 
 
 
GROUP INNO SIZE AGE ICT QUALITY EDUC DIVERSIF URBAN FINANCE LEGAL LABOR 
GAF 1.000            
INNO 0.096 1.000           
SIZE 0.145 0.241 1.000          
AGE 0.089 0.099 0.247 1.000         
ICT 0.099 0.243 0.294 0.096 1.000        
QUALITY 0.109 0.252 0.380 0.183 0.180 1.000       
EDUC 0.067 0.064 0.048 0.036 0.073 0.099 1.000      
DIVERSIF 0.053 0.141 0.085 0.133 0.095 0.084 0.053 1.000     
URBAN 0.018 0.023  - 0.077  - 0.004  - 0.048 0.020  - 0.035    -0.023 1.000    
FINANCE  - 0.045 0.006  - 0.112  - 0.083  - 0.024   - 0.096  - 0.034 0.003 0.051 1.000   
LEGAL 0.024 0.007 0.053 0.005 0.028 0.019  - 0.025 0.039 0.010 0.243 1.000  
LABOR 
 
0.038 
 
0.112 
 
0.079 
 
0.083 
 
0.118 
 
0.027 
 
0.000 
 
0.061 
 
0.037 
 
0.266 
 
0.384 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Econometric model and methods 
The econometric analysis seeks to estimate the relationship between 
group affiliation (GAF dummy) and firms’ innovation (INNO dum-
my), and how this relationship is affected by country-specific institu-
tional factors. As noted in previous research, one main issue that aris-
es in this context is that some firm-specific characteristics (measured 
or unobservable) may affect both the probability that a firm is a GAF 
and its performance. Khanna (2000: 752) calls this issue “winner 
picking”: if a firm has a successful performance, it is more likely that 
it will be invited to join a business group. A similar issue may arise in 
our study. Some firm-specific characteristics may in principle affect 
both the probability that a firm is selected to take part in a group and 
its ability or propensity to innovate. If this is the case, a problem of 
selection bias arises, due to the fact that firms self-select into two dif-
ferent categories, GAFs and SAFs, and this will affect the estimation 
of the group-innovation relationship.  
 
In order to properly take account of this issue, we use a two-equation 
approach and model both the probability that an enterprise is a GAF 
(equation 1) and its innovation propensity (equation 2). The first equa-
tion studies the factors that may determine why a firm is selected to 
take part in a group, whereas the second equation estimates the deter-
minants of its innovation propensity. These two equations form a re-
cursive system of equations, since the dependent variable in equation 
1 (GAF dummy) is included among the explanatory variables in equa-
tion 2. The full model specification is the following: 
 
GAFi = α1 + β1 SIZEi + γ1 AGEi + δ1 QUALITYi + ζ1 DIVERSIFi + η1 
LEGALi + θ1 FINANCEi + κ1 LABORi + λ1 Si + ρ1 Ci + εi1           (1) 
  
INNOi = ς2 + ω2 GAFi + β2 SIZEi + γ2 AGEi + δ2 QUALITYi + σ2 
EDUCi + τ2 ICTi +  η2 LEGALi + θ2 FINANCEi + κ2 LABORi + φ2 
URBANi + ψ2 INTERACTi + λ2 Si + ρ2 Ci +   + εi2                                         (2) 
 
In both equations, the explanatory variables include a set of firm-level 
characteristics (size, age, quality, product diversification, education 
level, ICT infrastructures, urban density), three country-level factors 
(legal, financial and labor market institutions), some interaction varia-
bles (defined below), plus the full set of sector and country dummies 
(Si and Ci respectively). 
All the firm-specific control variables are expected to take a positive 
sign in the estimations: the firm’s probability to be part of a group 
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(equation 1) and its innovation propensity (equation 2) are assumed to 
be positively related to the enterprise’s size, age, product quality, de-
gree of product diversification, human capital, ICT infrastructures, 
and geographical (urban) location.  The GAF variable in equation 2 is 
also assumed to be positive. As stated in hypothesis 1, GAFs are ex-
pected to have higher innovation propensity than SAFs.  
 
The role of the three country-level factors – legal, financial and labor 
market institutions – and their interactions with firm-specific factors, 
was pointed out by hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 (see section 3). Hypothesis 2 
postulates a positive relationship between these three institutional fac-
tors and the firm’s innovation propensity in equation 2.  
 
Hypothesis 3 points out that these institutional characteristics are more 
important factors for the innovativeness of GAFs than SAFs. We test 
this by creating three interaction variables, each of which interacts the 
GAF dummy with the three country-level institutional factors. These 
three interaction variables are included in equation 2 and are expected 
to have a positive sign in the estimations.  
 
Finally, hypothesis 4 argues that, across countries, GAFs’ innovative-
ness is higher in countries with better financial, legal and labor market 
institutions. We also test this by introducing six additional interaction 
terms in equation 2. These interaction variables are constructed as fol-
lows. First, for each of the three institutional variables, we carried out 
a simple hierarchical cluster analysis and divided the 20 countries in 
the sample into two groups: those whose institutional system is above 
average and those below average. Secondly, for each institutional var-
iable, we created two interaction variables, one between the GAF 
dummy and the “above average” country group dummy, and one be-
tween GAF and the “below average” country group dummy. Put it 
simply, these interaction variables test the hypothesis that the relation-
ship between GAF and INNO is piecewise linear: according to hy-
pothesis 4, we expect all of these interaction terms to have a positive 
sign, but we also expect the estimated coefficient to be higher for 
countries with a good institutional system than for economies with a 
weaker institutional set up.5 
 
As noted above, one important econometric issue that arises in the es-
timation of this model is so-called self-selection into categories: firms 
self-select into two different categories, GAFs and SAFs, and this is 
                                                 
5  A recent debate in the applied econometrics literature discusses the use and interpretation 
of interaction terms in non-linear models such as logit and probit. Ai and Norton (2003) 
opened this debate and criticized the common interpretation of interaction terms in non-
linear models. Greene (2010) and Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) have recently responded 
to this criticism and shown that the usual interpretation of interaction effects is reasonable 
and more informative than the method proposed by Ai and Norton.  
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likely to affect the estimation of the group-innovation relationship. 
Since firm-specific characteristics may affect both the probability that 
a firm is selected to take part in a group and its innovation propensity, 
the variable GAF in equation 2 is likely to be correlated with the error 
term, and its estimated elasticity does arguably overestimate the effect 
of group affiliation on innovation. Our strategy to cope with this issue 
is twofold. 
 
First, we use propensity score matching (PSM) estimations. The basic 
idea of the matching approach is to select a group of SAFs firms in the 
sample which are as similar as possible to the corresponding group of 
GAFs (conditional on a set of firm-level characteristics). By compar-
ing (matching) the two groups of enterprises, it is possible to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of the effect of group affiliation on innovation 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
 
The PSM method proceeds in three steps. First, it estimates the proba-
bility that a firm is a GAF, using as covariates variables that affect 
both the GAF dummy and the innovation dummy. This is a simple 
probit estimation of equation 1. Secondly, it creates two similar 
groups of firms, GAFs and SAFs, based on the propensity score ob-
tained in the first step. Thirdly, it compares the mean of the two 
groups. This estimated difference (so-called average treatment effect 
on the treated, ATT) provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
group affiliation on innovation propensity. 
 
The second approach we use is to estimate equations 1 and 2 through 
a recursive bivariate probit method, in which both equations are sim-
ultaneously estimated and the endogeneity of the GAF variable in 
equation 2 is properly handled by the way the model is estimated. The 
recursive bivariate probit is a seemingly unrelated regression model 
with correlated disturbances, in which the dependent variable of the 
first equation appears on the righ-hand-side of the second equation. 
The model is estimated by MLE. Greene (2003: 715-716) points out 
that in such a model the endogeneity of one of the RHS variables of 
the second equation can be neglected because this term does not affect 
the maximization of the log-likelihood (differently from what it would 
be the case in a linear recursive model not estimated by MLE). 

6. Results 
We first present the results of propensity score matching (table 4), and 
then the estimations of our two-equation system through the recursive 
bivariate probit model (tables 5 and 6). As explained in the previous 
section, the PSM method selects a group of SAFs firms in the sample 
which are as similar as possible to the corresponding group of GAFs 
(conditional on a set of firm-level characteristics) and, by comparing 
the two groups of enterprises, it provides an unbiased estimate of the 
effect of group affiliation on innovation.  
 
Table 4 presents the PSM results. We compare four sets of results: for 
two different model specifications (with and without the three coun-
try-level variables), and for two different matching methods (K-
nearest neighbors and kernel matching). These four sets of results are 
closely in line with each other. After creating two similar groups of 
firms (GAFs versus SAFs), conditional on the set of firm-level charac-
teristics outlined in equation 1, a comparison of the two indicates that 
GAFs have on average an innovation propensity of nearly 59%, 
whereas the mean for the SAF control group is around 50%. The dif-
ference between the two (the ATT, i.e. the average treatment effect on 
the treated) is around 9%. This is our unbiased estimate of the effect 
of group affiliation on innovation propensity. These results provide 
support for our first hypothesis (H1), indicating that in our sample of 
firms operating in Latin America the innovation propensity of GAFs is 
9% higher than that of SAFs.6  
 
 
                                                 
6  We have also repeated the same PSM exercise with a different dependent variable, in 
order to test whether these results also hold for the indicator “NEW_PROD” (a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm has introduced a new product in the period). The re-
sults for this innovation outcome variable are closely in line with those for the R&D vari-
able: the estimated ATT is in the range between 8.6 and 9.3%. Therefore, our main result 
that GAFs are more innovative than SAFs does not only hold for the innovative propensi-
ty of firms, but it does also extend to their technological performance. 
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Table 4: Propensity score matching (PSM) estimation results. 
 
 
 
 
Full model specification  
(as in equation 1) 
 
 
Model excluding  
the three country-level variables 
 
Matching method 
 
K-nearest neighbors 
 
Kernel 
 
K-nearest neighbors 
 
Kernel 
 
Average GAF 
(treated) 
0.589 0.589 0.584 0.584 
Average SAF 
(controls) 
0.509 0.496 0.498 0.495 
Difference  
(ATT) 
0.080 0.093 0.086 0.089 
Standard 
error 
     0.021***       0.020***       0.020***       0.020*** 
Number of GAF 
(treated) 
733 733 756 756 
Number of SAF 
(controls) 
5146 5146 5375 5375 
Mean bias: 
Before matching 
15.6% 15.6% 16.2% 16.2% 
Mean bias:  
After matching 
 
3.3% 
 
3.4% 
 
2.2% 
 
2.7% 
 
 
Legend: GAF: group-affiliated firms; SAF: Standalone firms; ATT: average treat-
ment effect on the treated 
 
We then shift the focus to the results of the estimations of our two-
equation system through the recursive bivariate probit model. Equa-
tion 2 is the specification of our main interest, investigating the deter-
minants of firms’ innovation propensity and providing tests of the hy-
potheses outlined in section 3. On the other hand, the estimation of 
equation 1, investigating the determinants of the probability that a 
firm is a GAF, simply represents a first stage in the econometric anal-
ysis but does not provide any direct information on the hypotheses of 
our interest. We therefore report these results in the Appendix table 
A1, but will not comment them further here. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation 2. Before dis-
cussing the results of these tests, it is interesting to look at the esti-
mates for the firm-specific (control) variables included in equation 2. 
As expected, four of the firm-level factors matter for the innovative-
ness of enterprises in Latin America. Firms are more likely to be in-
novators the greater their size, product quality and ICT infrastructure. 
Innovation propensity is also positively related to the size of the urban 
location in which firms are located, reflecting urban density and ag-
glomeration economies. By contrast, differently from our expecta-
tions, two firm-level characteristics are not significantly related to the 
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R&D dummy. Firm age and its human capital level (number of educa-
tion years of full-time permanent employees) do not in fact seem to 
have an effect on the probability that an enterprise undertakes R&D 
investments. 
 
A key explanatory variable in equation 2 is the GAF dummy, which 
tests for our first hypothesis that group-affiliated firms are more inno-
vative than standalone enterprises (H1). In line with the results of pro-
pensity score matching estimations, this hypothesis receives strong 
and significant support: table 5 shows that the estimated coefficient of 
the GAF dummy is positive and significant. 
 
Our second hypothesis argues that country-level institutions (financial, 
legal and labor market) are important for the innovativeness of firms 
in the region (H2). This is a general proposition that it is expected to 
hold for all firms in the sample and does not specifically refer to 
group-affiliated enterprises. Table 5 provides empirical support for 
this hypothesis. The variables FINANCE, LEGAL and LABOR are all 
positively and significantly related to the innovation dummy depend-
ent variable. LABOR is the factor that turns out to have the strongest 
estimated coefficient, providing evidence that extensive and ineffi-
cient labor market regulations may prove to be an important obstacle 
to business firms’ activities and performance (Botero et al., 2004; 
Schneider, 2009).  
 
Hypothesis 3 postulates a positive relationship between financial, le-
gal and labor market institutions, on the one hand, and GAFs’ innova-
tiveness, on the other (H3). As explained in the previous section, we 
test this proposition by introducing three variables that interact the 
GAF dummy with each of the country-specific institutional variables. 
The interaction LEGAL * GROUP turns out to be positive and signif-
icant (see columns 7 and 9), whereas the other two are not significant. 
This result provides partial support for our third hypothesis, and sug-
gests in particular that legal factors are more important for the innova-
tiveness of GAFs than for standalone firms. Our interpretation of this 
result is that, if legal institutions (legal courts) in a country are weak, 
the lack of IPRs protection and efficient contract enforcing mecha-
nisms will penalize GAFs more strongly than SAFs, since the former 
are more engaged in R&D activities than the latter (as shown by H1). 
 
Table 6 reports the results of tests of hypothesis 4, which investigates 
the cross-country implication of the previous patterns. H4 states that, 
across countries, the difference between the innovativeness of GAFs 
and SAFs is stronger in countries with better financial, legal and labor 
market institutions. This proposition is tested in regressions 11, 12 and 
13, which make use of a piecewise linear specification in which the 
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GAF coefficient is allowed to differ across two country groups: one 
characterized by stronger and more efficient financial, legal and labor 
market institutions, and the other with a weaker and less efficient in-
stitutional set up (see section 5 for a definition of the six interaction 
variables that are inserted in regressions 11, 12 and 13). As expected, 
the six interaction terms that are used to test H4 are all positive and 
significant and, in particular, they show that the effect of group affilia-
tion on innovation is stronger for countries with a good institutional 
system than for economies characterized by weaker institutional con-
ditions.  
 
In short, we find that, across countries in Latin America, the innova-
tiveness of GAFs is higher for countries with better legal, financial 
and labor market systems. As discussed in section 3, our interpretation 
of this pattern is that firm-level innovative activities are greatly sup-
ported by country-level infrastructures and national systems of inno-
vation: the stronger and more efficient these country-specific support 
mechanisms, the higher the innovativeness of business groups. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for equation 2. Dependent variable: 
INNO. Estimation method: bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
H1 GAF 
0.676 
(2.08)** 
0.531 
(1.53) 
0.669 
(1.91)* 
0.596 
(1.68)* 
 SIZE 
0.233 
(7.29)*** 
0.237 
(7.40)*** 
0.234 
(7.30)*** 
0.236 
(7.34)*** 
 AGE 
-0.0003 
(0.33) 
-0.0003 
(0.35) 
-0.0002 
(0.31) 
-0.0003 
(0.33) 
 ICT 
0.708 
(10.53)*** 
0.709 
(10.54)*** 
0.709 
(10.54)*** 
0.708  
(10.50)*** 
 QUALITY 
0.368 
(7.52)*** 
0.372 
(7.62)*** 
0.369 
(7.54)*** 
0.371 
(7.56)*** 
 EDUC 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.68) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
 URBAN 
0.047 
(2.66)*** 
0.048 
(2.68)*** 
0.047 
(2.65)*** 
0.047 
(2.67)*** 
 
FINANCE 
0.026 
(1.55) 
0.027 
(1.70)* 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.027 
(1.64) 
H2 LEGAL 
0.026 
(1.73)* 
0.018 
(1.15) 
0.026 
(1.72)* 
0.017 
(1.05) 
 LABOR 
0.049 
(2.78)*** 
0.048 
(2.73)*** 
0.048 
(2.62)*** 
0.052 
(2.81)*** 
 
FINANCE * GAF 
0.014 
(0.31) 
  
-0.008 
(0.16) 
H3 LEGAL * GAF  
0.069 
(1.74)* 
 
0.086 
(1.88)* 
 LABOR * GAF   
0.005 
(0.12) 
-0.038 
(0.74) 
 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
LR χ2 
 
1459.54*** 1456.58*** 1456.50*** 1460.15*** 
 
Observations 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 
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Table 6: Estimation results for equation 2. Dependent variable: 
INNO. Estimation method: bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) 
H1 GAF 
0.683  
(2.08)** 
   
 SIZE 
0.234 
(7.31)*** 
0.234 
(7.31)*** 
0.233 
(7.29)*** 
0.233 
(7.29)*** 
 AGE 
-0.0002 
(0.31) 
-0.0003 
(0.30) 
-0.0003 
(0.30) 
-0.0003 
(0.30) 
 ICT 
0.709 
(10.54)*** 
0.709 
(10.53)*** 
0.708 
(10.53)*** 
0.708 
(10.53)*** 
 QUALITY 
0.369 
(7.54)*** 
0.369 
(7.55)*** 
0.368 
(7.51)*** 
0.368 
(7.51)*** 
 EDUC 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
 URBAN 
0.047 
(2.65)*** 
0.047 
(2.64)*** 
0.047 
(2.63)*** 
0.047 
(2.63)*** 
 
FINANCE 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.028 
(1.73)* 
0.028 
(1.73)* 
H2 LEGAL 
0.026 
(1.74)* 
0.026 
(1.75)* 
0.026 
(1.74)* 
0.026 
(1.74)* 
 LABOR 
0.048 
(2.77)*** 
0.048 
(2.76)*** 
0.048 
(2.76)*** 
0.048 
(2.76)*** 
 GAF * FINANCE 
GOOD 
 
0.693 
(2.09)** 
  
 
GAF * FINANCE 
BAD 
 
0.672 
(2.02)** 
  
 
GAF *LEGAL 
GOOD 
  
0.732 
(2.13)** 
 
H4 
 
GAF * LEGAL BAD   
0.684 
(2.11)** 
 
 
GAF *LABOR 
GOOD 
   
0.732 
(2.13)** 
 GAF * LABOR BAD    
0.684 
(2.11)** 
 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Observations 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
 
5466 
 
 
5466 
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To assess the robustness of this result, it is important to consider two 
questions. (1) Is this cross-country result affected by the fact that our 
indicators of country-specific institutional conditions (FINANCE, 
LEGAL, LABOR) are constructed on the basis of private firms’ own 
perceptions of the institutional environment in which they operate? (2) 
Does this result indicate a specific pattern only valid for Latin Ameri-
can countries, rather than all emerging economies worldwide?  
 
Table 7 reports some descriptive evidence providing a negative an-
swer to both of these questions. The table presents the correlation be-
tween the innovativeness of GAFs (average for each country) and a 
set of country-level indicators of financial, legal and labor market in-
stitutions, along with other structural characteristics (human capital, 
physical and ICT infrastructures). As indicated in the last column of 
the table, these indicators are taken from commonly available data 
sources (e.g. World Bank WDI, Heritage Foundation, Botero et al., 
2004). These variables are not constructed on the basis of the enter-
prises’ own perceptions about their institutional environment, but 
based on the independent assessment and calculations made by these 
data providing agencies. Further, these indicators are available for a 
large cross-section of 75 emerging economies worldwide, so that we 
may compare patterns in Latin America with those elsewhere in the 
developing world.  
 
The correlation coefficients reported in table 7 all confirm the results 
of the test of hypothesis 4 carried out on the WBES survey dataset. 
Across countries, the innovativeness of business groups is higher for 
national economies with a more developed financial infrastructure, 
more efficient legal institutions, and a less regulated and more flexible 
labor market. Besides, groups’ innovativeness is also positively relat-
ed to countries’ human capital, physical and ICT infrastructures. 
These correlation patterns hold for both the Latin American sample 
and the larger sample including all emerging economies. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4 does not indicate a specific pattern only valid for Latin 
American countries, but rather a general regularity characterizing 
emerging economies worldwide. 
 
 
Table 7: Coefficients of correlation between GAFs’ innovativeness and country-specific institutional conditions.  
 
Country characteristics 
 
Variable 
 
Whole sample 
(N=75) 
Latin America 
(N=20) 
Definition 
of variable 
Source 
 
 
Financial institutions 
 
FINANCE FREEDOM 
 
+ 0.225 + 0.166 Freedom of finance  Heritage Foundation 
 
 
STOCKS TRADED 
 
+ 0.055 + 0.046 Stocks traded, % of GDP  World Bank, WDI 
 
 
Legal institutions 
 
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
+ 0.178 + 0.044 
Corruption perception index 
(0: high corr..; 10: low corr.) 
Transparency International 
 
 
FREEDOM OF PRESS 
 
+ 0.217 + 0.197 Freedom of press index Reporters Without Borders 
 
 
Labor market  institutions 
 
LABOR UNION POWER 
 
- 0.076 - 0.597 
Index measuring the statutory protec-
tion and power of unions 
Botero et al. (2004) 
 
 
COLLECTIVE DISPUTES 
 
- 0.027 - 0.596 
Index measuring the protection of 
workers during collective disputes 
Botero et al. (2004) 
 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
+ 0.250 + 0.344 Mean years of schooling World Bank, WDI 
Other structural  
characteristics 
 
PHYISICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
+ 0.201 + 0.097 Electric power consumption World Bank, WDI 
 
 
ICT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
+ 0.249 + 0.620 Internet users per 1000 people World Bank, WDI 
 
. 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
The paper has carried out an empirical analysis of the innovative ac-
tivities of business groups in Latin America. The study has compared 
the innovativeness of group-affiliated firms and standalone enterpris-
es, and it has then investigated how country-specific institutional fac-
tors – financial, legal, and labor market institutions – affect the group-
innovation relationship. The empirical analysis has made use of the 
extensive dataset made available by the most recent wave of the 
WBES (period 2010-2011), providing a rich set of information on 
6500 manufacturing firms in 20 Latin American countries. The econ-
ometric results point out two major conclusions, which we summarize 
here along with a brief discussion of their policy implications. 
 
The first main conclusion is that GAFs are more innovative than 
SAFs. After controlling for a large set of firm- and country-specific 
characteristics, and correcting for the possible self-selection bias due 
to the winner-picking mechanism, our econometric analysis estimates 
that the innovation propensity of GAFs is about 9% higher than that 
for SAFs. The result of a positive effect of group affiliation on innova-
tion is in line with the other few empirical studies analyzing this topic 
(Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Mahmood and Lee, 2004; Chang et 
al., 2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010). 
 
An implication of this result is that, by fostering the technological dy-
namics of the national system in which they operate, business groups 
have an important welfare-enhancing function in emerging economies, 
since they contribute to the process of domestic capability building 
and economic transformation through knowledge spillovers. At the 
same time, however, this also implies that standalone firms, which 
represent a great majority of the business population in Latin America, 
are losing ground and progressively becoming less competitive than 
the relatively small number of business groups that dominate domestic 
markets in these emerging economies. This type of diverging dynam-
ics may have negative effects on the income distribution and further 
exacerbate income and social inequalities that do currently represent a 
major issue in Latin America. In order to counteract this diverging dy-
namics, national authorities should more systematically provide inno-
vation policy support to standalone enterprises, targeting their techno-
logical capabilities, human capital as well as their access to financial 
capital and physical and ICT infrastructures. 
The second main conclusion of our empirical analysis is that, across 
countries, the innovativeness of GAFs is higher for national econo-
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mies with a better institutional system than for countries with a less 
efficient institutional set up. Financial, legal and labor market institu-
tions provide an important infrastructure sustaining business firms’ 
innovation activities, and this enhancing effect is stronger for group-
affiliated firms in well-functioning and well-organized national sys-
tems of innovation. While it is true that GAFs may have strong inter-
nal capabilities and resources and hence partly make up for weak or 
inefficient institutions, as shown in previous research, we also find 
that firm-level innovative activities are greatly supported by country-
level infrastructures and national systems of innovation: the stronger 
and more efficient these country-specific support mechanisms, the 
higher the innovativeness of business groups.   
 
An implication of this result is that institutional changes and economic 
reforms intended to make domestic markets more open, competitive 
and efficient – such as the extensive wave of privatizations, trade lib-
eralization, financial and macroeconomic stabilization undertaken in 
many Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s – will not 
necessarily drive business groups out of the market, as it is sometimes 
argued in the literature. By contrast, the effect of institutional changes 
and market liberalization is often that business groups, by exploiting 
their superior capabilities and dominant market position, are able to 
develop new strategies and find new market niches, whereas smaller 
standalone firms are more likely to loose market shares and shrink 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The Latin American case analyzed in this 
paper does on the whole suggest that, when focusing on business 
groups innovation activities, a process of creative destruction is in 
place, according to which larger and well established domestic firms 
survive whereas smaller and less competitive enterprises are eventual-
ly driven out of the market. It is this evolutionary process – driven by 
competition, selection and innovation – that explains business dynam-
ics in contemporary Latin America. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Estimation results for equation 1. Dependent variable: 
GAF. Estimation method: bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE 
0.237 
(7.17)*** 
0.233 
(7.05)*** 
0.237 
(7.16)*** 
0.237 
(7.14)*** 
0.231 
(6.94)*** 
AGE 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.002 
(1.68)* 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.002 
(1.64) 
QUALITY 
0.173 
(3.14)*** 
0.167 
(3.04)*** 
0.173 
(3.14)*** 
0.173 
(3.14)*** 
0.167 
(3.04)*** 
DIVERSIF 
0.003 
(2.86)*** 
0.003 
(2.94)*** 
0.003 
(2.86)*** 
0.002 
(2.86)*** 
0.003 
(2.93)*** 
FINANCE  
-0.037 
(1.90)* 
  
-0.043 
(2.06)** 
LEGAL   
0.003 
(0.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.55) 
LABOR    
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.36) 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
LR χ2 
 
1452.19*** 1455.81*** 1452.23*** 1452.19*** 1456.48 
Observations 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 5466 
 
 
 
